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Concerning Secularists' Proposed Restrictions on
the Role of Religion in American Politics
Richard H. Jones*
What is the proper role of religious convictions in deciding
political issues in America? Recent answers to this question
run the gamut from the complete denial of any role of religious
faith in justifying, and perhaps even motivating, laws or other
public policies (the secularists, such as Bruce Ackerman,
Thomas Nagel, and Robert Audi) 1 to permitting only a certain
type of religious faith to enter our political arena (Michael
Perry? to suggesting that religious adherents should
voluntarily bracket their religious commitments in certain instances (Kent Greenawalt). 3
In this article, I will defend the extreme position, usually
attacked today in academic circles in our society: that of a
full-blooded role for all religious commitments as legitimate
sources of justification and motivation of the position one takes
on any public issue. The only limitation (with minor
qualifications) that we should recognize on what can be

* A.B. Brown University, 1973; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D. Columbia University,
1980; J.D. University of California at Berkeley, 1985.
1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of
Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 259 (1989) [hereinafter The Separation of Church
and State], Religion and the Ethics of Political Participation, 100 ETmcs 386
(1990), and Religious Commitment and Secular Reason: A Reply to Professor
Weithman, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1991) [hereinafter Religious Commitment];
Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PmL. & PuB. AFF. 215,
218-34 (1987).
2 MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991).
3 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988)
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; Religious Convictions and Political Choice:
Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019 (1990) [hereinafter Some Further
Thoughts]. That Greenawalt would accept a role for religious convictions in certain
instances and his discussion of the Establishment Clause separate him from the
secularists on important points.

343

344

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

advocated in politics in our society-and it is an important
one-is imposed by the Establishment Clause.
This article sets forth the argument for this position in
four parts. Part I explores certain points about what
constitutes religion relevant to this issue. Part II advances an
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as it is applicable to
politics. Part III discusses the role of reliance on religious commitments within the political process in a society based upon
the Establishment Clause, and part IV points out certain
problems with secularists' visions for our society. 4
I.

RELIGION

A. Religion as a Way of Life
Those who favor a strict separation of "church and state"
most often characterize religion as, in the words of Thomas
Jefferson, a private "matter which lies solely between man and
his God."5 As the accommodationist Chief Justice Warren Burger stated, "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institution of private choice."6 Secularists (i.e., those who would deny
religion any legitimate role in political decision-making or other
public matters) take this view as ruling out the legitimacy of
religion influencing civic affairs through the actions of private
individuals acting upon their private religious convictions.
Religion is reduced to a private matter for individuals, families,
or private groups and of no relevance for issues that govern
society as a whole.
This view, however, misses the most important point about
the role of religion in American politics: the way in which religion is comprehensive. Needless to say, not everyone who
claims to be religious takes religion seriously; many merely
identify with the religion of their youth or attend religious

4 Whether a distinction should be drawn between private citizens and
public officials on this issue will not be addressed here. See Some Further
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1035-36.
5 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citing Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)). Separationist
characterizations of religion (such as those of James Madison) are most often cited
in discussions of the Framers of the Establishment Clause; but these do not necessarily represent the views of all who revised and ratified the First Amendment.
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 54-55 (1986).
6 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
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services for an hour on weekends without religious faith affecting the rest of their lives. But the problem of religion in politics
centers on those people for whom religious faith is not reducible to the acceptance of a set of propositions having no bearing
outside one's intellectual life, or to an isolated set of personal
practices, or a set of customary social practices that one does
regardless of what one believes. Instead, religious faith for
them is commitment to an encompassing way of life whose
logical skeleton consists of (l) fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality and a person and history, (2) guides for action
(codes of conduct, norms, or ideals), and (3) values and goals,
all oriented around what Paul Tillich referred to as an "ultimate concern." 7 Not all religious ways of life successfully integrate these elements into a systematic, consistent whole, but
all these elements are present in them. One's faith provides the
framework within which one leads one's life and is expressed,
among other ways, in one's actions towards others.
Religious persons, like the nonreligious, search for a meaning and order which will bring coherence to the disparate elements of their lives. 8 What separates religious persons from
the nonreligious is that the former find some purpose or other
meaning to life, or a way to overcome suffering, that is not selfcreated, individually or collectively. In other words, while it is
certainly possible to have an ultimate concern or to find supreme meaning in what we are doing without being religious,
one cannot be religious and think that the significance of living
is only supplied by ourselves. For the religious, the meaning
instead comes from a source which, by definition, must transcend that to which it gives meaning. And thus, religious people claim that the meaning they find in life is not subjective
but is in some sense grounded in a reality encompassing us all.
This reality in our country is usually conceived of in various
theistic ways, but nontheistic realities are also possible sources
of religious meaning. All dimensions of life are interpreted in
light of this transcendent reality. The ultimate meaning and
significance of any activity, including politics, is understood in
terms of this source.
Traditionally, religions provide a vision of life in which the
most comprehensive ideas about the structure of reality (the

7 PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, 7-8 (1959).
8 PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY OF RELIGION 124-25 (1967).
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worldview) are such that the most general values and norms
(the ethos) of the way of life are appropriate. 9 The ethos, or
"style of doing things" (e.g., nonviolence or compassion), gives a
general orientation; even it does not determine one's course of
action in any actual, complex situation. Basic symbols, such as
"God," the Indian concept of "dharma," and the Taoist "tao," are
not disinterested, descriptive terms depicting reality but instead integrate factual and normative components into one
order. Thus, basic values and the way of life as a whole are
grounded in the very structure of reality. In this way, the predominant religion in a culture legitimizes the society's moral
order-the religion renders the social order acceptable to its
members and is therefore justified. 10
In sum, religion creates a framework providing meaning
for a person's life. It is therefore unrealistic to hope to relegate
religious faith to the realm of purely private opinion which
should have no consequences for one's life as a whole or for
one's public action in particular. 11 Not only does religion govern more than the limited areas in the life of the religious, it is
irreducible to something exclusively personal or private. Instead, religion is comprehensive in the sense that all aspects of
one's life are related in one degree or another to this fundamental framework.

B.

The Social and Political Expression of Religion

The social and political expression of a religious person's
life cannot be left outside of this fundamental and comprehensive framework. Religion is never solely about life after death,
or similar "other-worldly" matters, or any strictly private matter-it concerns the whole of our lives here and now. As part of
this, actions toward other people are an essential part of religious ways of life, whether these actions are expressed on a
one-to-one basis or on a society-wide basis. 12 As Tillich said,

9 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 7, 89-90, 127 (1973).
10 ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS OF RELIGION IN A
POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 21 (1970); BERGER, supra note 8, at 33.
11 Religion is very much a social and public phenomenon. Each person's religious beliefs, values and practices may be his or her own variation or interpretation, but the components of one's religious faith are not individual to the exclusion
of any role for a religious community and a continuing tradition. Religion is seldom
private in the sense of being totally individual. The communal and historical dimensions of faith are paramount.
12 Like many liberal dichotomies, the political distinction between "public"
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"an ultimate concern must express itself socially. It cannot
leave out any sphere of human existence." 13 Even for religious
communities which withdraw from society at large, issues of
governing remain.
In most Jewish and Christian traditions, God is viewed as
concerned with human history, and it is the faithful's obligation
to follow God's will on earth. Active participation in most public
aspects of life becomes an obligation. One consequence of this is
that there is no absolute dichotomy between religion and politics-politics of course is open to the nonreligious, and religion
encompasses more than politics, but concern with social and
political issues is one dimension of a religious way of life. 14 In
short, participation in public life is part of the traditional religious life.
Thus, the realms of God and Caesar are not totally distinct. Indeed, in many cultures and eras, church and state exist
only within one order. This brings up another misapplied dichotomy-that between the religious and the secular. Secularization is related to a decline in the influence of religion, although "secular" is a term, like "religion," for which there is no
established meaning or agreed-upon use. 15 American politics
was "secularized" by the Establishment Clause in that our
Constitution precludes religious authorities (texts, institutions,
traditions, experiences, and persons) from being the exclusive
source for justifying political positions-the unified
church/state order was replaced by a "new order for the ages"
in this regard. Thus, religion's traditional role in legitimizing
our society was undercut.

and "private" life has been called into question. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages
of Decline of the Public I Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
13 TILLICH, supra note 7, at 178.
14 "Social" and "political" cannot be absolutely distinguished. Politics may be
construed broadly to include any issues related to power and economics, or restricted narrowly to problems of governing or managing a society. But both social and
political issues involve concern for how people live together and thus cannot be
completely separated. Similarly, morality, which involves how we act toward others
and what weight we give to their well-being, may be expressed in individual interactions or on a society-wide scale. Thus, morality and politics do not operate in
totally distinct realms either.
15 See Larry Shiner, The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research, 6
J. Sci. STUD. RELIGION 207 (1967) (covering the history of the term "secularization," identifying six different senses of the term, and arguing that the term should
be dropped from empirical research because of the ambiguity in its use or explicitly recognized as covering more than one idea).
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But some theorists on the role of religion in American
politics have been misled by the concept "secular" to conclude
that there is a dichotomy of a religious realm and a secular
one. "Secular" for these theorists comes to mean "nonreligious"
plain and simple-something totally distinct from religion. In
particular, our political realm must be nonreligious or antireligious in the strong sense that religion can play no role in politics. Religion is thereby reduced from being the defining characteristic of a society to being totally privatized, i.e., having no
direct or indirect public role. However, if "secular" is taken to
mean "barren of religion" or "hostile to religion," then politics
in America is not secular and was never meant to be. Instead,
as will be discussed below, 16 a better concept for describing
the public life under our Establishment Clause is that of neutrality between religion and nonreligion. The religious have
rights equal to the nonreligious in the public sphere (within the
limits set by the Establishment Clause). Under our Constitution, government cannot marginalize or exclude religion from
public life.
The religious often take stands on "religious" issues (such
as school prayer), but they also take stands on issues which
secularists consider "secular" (such as abortion and slavery).
Religious stands on political issues seem out of place to secularists because they wrongly equate religion with other-worldly
concerns or private conduct. Secularists apparently would permit the religious to believe whatever they want but not to act
on those beliefs; they would reduce religion to merely ideas, not
the framework of one's entire life. However, if secularists realized the comprehensive nature of religion, they would see that
taking a stand on worldly issues is actually integral to many
religious ways of life-political activity is an integral part of
such ways of life, not merely an incidental consequence of belief
which can be eliminated without affecting the way of life itself.
Not all religious ways of life are concerned directly with politics, if politics is narrowly conceived as activities relating to the
structures and processes of governing society. Nevertheless,
social issues and politics are never totally distinguishable, and
social issues of concern to many religious persons are part of
the political realm. For example, to the religious, concerns for

16 See discussion infra part II.A.l.
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the poor and for justice are at the same time worldly and religious.
However, while religion has a social/political dimension,
not all religious people-even those whose faith shapes their
lives deeply-feel compelled, when acting upon social issues on
a society-wide scale, to impose on nonbelievers what their religious faith dictates. For example, Governor Mario Cuomo personally accepts the Catholic prohibition against abortion but
does not feel that abortion should be prohibited for all people. 17 This does not mean he is insincere or does not take his
religious faith seriously, but merely that in making political
decisions affecting all people, his religious code of conduct is
not his only consideration.
There is no contradiction in accepting certain principles as
governing one's own personal conduct (and that of those who
also voluntarily adopt them) and yet not requiring everyone to
do likewise. For example, the issue is not what you would do if
you became pregnant by rape but the separate issue of what
you would require or allow other rape victims to do. Even some
Evangelical Christians choose a non-imposition option because
of the principles of religious liberty and tolerance. 18
Other religious people are more theocratic and weigh competing considerations very differently. In a theocracy, the religious authority is seen as answering the basic political questions, and thus no political function exists for the citizenry
except to enact what the religious authority states is to be the
law. Church and state are thereby integrated: the state authority is used to enforce conformity to a particular religious code
on everyone. The theocrats' objective is to require all people to
follow their code of conduct by making the public laws mirror
what their religion demands of everyone's actions. The laws
enacted in the state become those of a particular religious
group, and that group's religious precepts are thereby imposed
upon nonbelievers regardless of their beliefs. 19

17 Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic
Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'V 13 (1984). Justice
William Brennan is another example of a public official who was both a staunch
separationist and an observant Roman Catholic.
18 See Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to
Professor Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 292-93 (1992).
19 For the distinction between imposition of a religious position and having
a secular (nontheocratic) purpose or reason for a religious position, see discussion
infra part II.B.
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Secularists misconstrue the nature of religion in thinking
that the logic of religious faith dictates that religious persons
must try to impose their principles on the population as a
whole. That is, if a group believes it has discovered the ultimate truth, its members have no choice but to try to require it
of everyone. 20 In short, to be religious is to be theocratic. But
secularists must realize that there is no one "religious" position
on the issue of governing. In addition to Governor Cuomo's
example, the fact that some religious groups (e.g., the Amish)
withdraw from society at large demonstrates this point. Religious precepts, while comprehensive and compelling for the
faithful, are not always felt to be required of everyone else in
society, regardless of their faith. That is, the religious precepts
of a community of believers govern their own lives and actions
toward others. 21 Politics involves another issue: how people
outside one's religious community should themselves act. A
decision has to be made by the religious as to how their faith
relates to that issue. As indicated above, the decision is not a
question of how sincerely or seriously one holds one's faith but
what to require of people outside one's faith. A political judgment, made within the framework of one's faith, is still needed.
One option is neither to attempt to keep one's religious precepts strictly private nor to impose them by force of law on
society as a whole, but to have one's faith inform one's political
decisions as to how other people should act. One's faith in such
circumstances would be a central consideration but not the only
factor in determining what political position one chooses.
In sum, secularists in their characterizations of religion
miss an essential and separate issue in the area of governing:
how should the religious deal with the conduct of people out-

20 E.g., Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITI.
L. REV. 176 (1990).
21 People may feel alienated if a political position they oppose wins majority
support; they may feel the laws are being imposed upon them. If the religious feel
that God's law supersedes the nation's laws, and therefore they do not have to
obey the latter, the issue is not a theocracy but a Free Exercise exemption to the
applicable laws. The Supreme Court in Employment Div. v. Smith, 472 U.S. 872,
reh'g denied., 496 U.S. 913 (1990), came close to eviscerating the Free Exercise
Clause in holding that the religious could not claim an exemption, no matter how
compelling their religious reasons, to any neutral and generally applicable law. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 reinstates the "compelling state interest"
requirement for enforcing a law when a Free Exercise exemption is claimed.
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side their faith? To this question, there is no one "religious"
answer. 22
C.

The Concreteness of Religions

Michael Perry has made the nature of religion an issue in
the question of the role of religion in American politics. Perry's
vision of "ecumenical politics" would permit only a certain type
of conviction to be relied upon in political discussions. Perry
would exclude "sectarian" religious beliefs, i.e., those beliefs
which are considered "epistemologically privileged" and not
intelligible or accessible to people who do not share those beliefs.23 To this end, he distinguishes between "religious faith"
and "religious beliefs."24 Religious faith is characterized as
"trust in the ultimate meaningfulness of life-that is, the ultimate meaningfulness of the world and of one's own life, one's
own being, as part of and related to, as embedded in, the
world."25 Contrasted with this is religious belief: belief is "religious faith mediated by-understood and expressed in the
medium of-words, whether concretely, in stories, or abstractly,
in concepts and ideas."26 In this way, an "unknowable reality"
becomes an object of belief as the specific source of meaning for
a religious person.
Perry would permit into political discussions only those
persons who are willing to subject their religious commitments
to a "self-critical rationality."27 What remains after this exercise is faith, as distinct from the particular beliefs of a specific religious tradition. Persons of religious faith, in contrast to
those of religious belief, can share "commitment to certain authoritative political-moral premises" and a pluralistic form of
government. 28
The problem with this proposal is basic: all religious commitment is "sectarian"-there is no generic religious faith disembodied from specific religious beliefs. Perry's characterization
of religious faith may be useful as a definition of religion, but it

22 Secularists' embarrassing caricatures of religion (e.g., ACKERMAN, supra
note 1, at 40) reveal a lack of understanding of the subject under study that probably would not be tolerated for any other subject in academia.
23 PERRY, supra note 2, at 106.
24 !d. at 100-01.
25 !d. at 73.
26 !d.
27 !d. at 74, 103.
28 !d. at 125.

352

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

does not follow that there is any abstract, beliefless faith that
is the substance to which all truly religious persons should actually adhere. To use an analogy, consider language. No one
speaks language in the abstract. Instead, we speak English or
some other specific language-there is no generic "language"
but only a collection of activities that share a common feature
or have family resemblances among themselves that we call
languages. 29
The same is true of religion: no one has a contentless faith
in some generic Ultimate Reality or a commitment to the "ultimate meaningfulness of life" in the abstract-all religious persons have specific beliefs. 30 These beliefs cannot be treated as
mere vehicles to an abstract, unknowable reality any more
than specific languages can be treated as mere attempts to
speak language in the abstract. Beliefs and values are the substance of a person's way of life, determining how one sees the
world and treats others. Concrete beliefs and values of a total
way of life, not an abstract category ("faith") within which all
such ways of life fall, provide meaning to one's life. To say that
the religious should not become too attached to their beliefs is
to miss entirely the significance of such beliefs within a way of
life.
Similarly, different concepts of God and nontheistic transcendent realities may all fall within the category theorists
create called "Ultimate Reality." But that does not mean any
religious person has faith in an abstract category rather than
some concrete, highly-delineated reality. 31 Belief in God is not
a matter of faith (in Perry's sense of the term) but is as sectarian as belief in Jesus as the Christ or in the sacredness of the
Qur'an. All versions of theism contrast, for example, with the
29 George Santayana made the inverse point: "Any attempt to speak, without
speaking some particular language, is just as hopeless as the attempt to have a
religion that shall be no religion in particular." REASON IN RELIGION 15 (1906).
30 "Believe" in the context of religion should not be contrasted with "know"
to suggest an element of doubt or uncertainty. Instead, "believe" denotes a declaration of one's faith (e.g., to "believe in" God means more than an intellectual assent
to the proposition that there is a God), and one's "beliefs" are the intellectual content entailed by the commitment to a way of life.
31 Perry may properly cite an historian of religions, Wilfred Cantwell Smith,
for some support. Smith divides religion into two components: "personal faith,"
which all religious people share, and the differing "cumulative traditions" which are
the vehicles for faith. See generally WILFRED C. SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF
RELIGION (1963) and FAITH AND BELIEF (1979). However, while Smith's work is
highly influential, he does not have many followers on this point among historians
of religions.
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Brahman/Atman of Advaita Vedanta in that the religious reality in each of them is conceived as a personal, loving source. To
reduce religion to some "faithness," devoid of any belief and
value content, about the nature of reality, a person, and history
is impossible. Religion is not an intellectual exercise; it is a
way of life, and belief in a concrete reality informs that way of
life. Perhaps some intellectuals, such as John Dewey in A Common Faith, with his vague sense of transcendence, might satisfy Perry (even though that conception is itself specific and
different from traditional religious realities). 32 But all religious persons who adhere to more than a merely ethical "religion" have no such abstractions at the center of their ways of
life.
No study of religious persons could reveal them to be anything but "sectarian." Thus, despite what Perry says, all religious discourse would have to be excluded from public political
discussions if his proposal were accepted. That such a position
conflicts with the Establishment Clause is the next topic.

II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Central to the position I am defending is that the Establishment Clause encapsulates the vision of what public role
religion should play in our society. However, the constitutional
requirement that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion"33 is subject to very different interpretations. Therefore, I must clarify the interpretation of the
clause advocated here as it applies to the issue of religion in
politics.
A.

Presuppositions of the Establishment Clause

That there is no neutral interpretation of the
anti-establishment requirement is evidenced by the dispute
over the intent of the Framers between the "separationists"
(who adhere, in different degrees, to a strict separation of
church and state) and the "accommodationists" (who would
permit varying degrees of public accommodation of religion,
short of an established church). 34 However, the clause in its
32 JoHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 29-57 (1934).
33 U.S. CaNST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause became applicable to the
states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 u.s. 1, 15 (1947).
34 For a study of the tension between the two approaches see Richard H.
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historical context appears to presuppose three fundamental
premises which favor a generally separationist interpretation:
neutrality between religions, the separation of the institutions
of church and state, and a favorable view of a role for religion
in American public life.

1. The government must be officially neutral with regard to
religion
First, the Framers lived in a religious society which may
have had a de facto Protestant establishment, but the Establishment Clause they created envisions a society in which the
government must be officially neutral between religions. 35 No
religion is to be privileged, and thus our society is religiously
pluralistic in the eyes of the law. The Supreme Court has articulated this principle to mean that under the Establishment
Clause the government cannot establish an official church, and
in addition, cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."36 Thus, "government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious
doctrine or organization."37 This principle does not mean government must take a hostile, anti-religious stance; rather, the

Jones, Accommodationist and Separationist Ideals in Supreme Court Establishment
Clause Decisions, 28 J. CHURCH & ST. 193 (1986). Political theorists may not be
interested in what the Framers intended, arguing that the role of religion in politics has now changed. But the Framers' intent is what courts purport to look at in
their decisions.
35 E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985). Neutrality itself is open to separationist and
accommodationist interpretations. See Jones, supra note 34, at 204-06. The Supreme Court has made the controversial expansion of this neutrality principle to
include not aiding religion over nonreligion. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. It may be
argued that the Establishment Clause permits favoring religion over nonreligion.
See Richard H. Jones, "In God We Trust" and the Establishment Clause, 31 J.
CHURCH & ST. 411-16 (1989). Nonreligion in the form of atheism (i.e., the denial of
any kind of God) simply did not exist in America at the time the Constitution was
framed. JAMES TuRNER, WITHOUT GoD, WITHOUT CREED 44 (1985). Therefore, the
Framers in all likelihood were not considering the relation of religion and
nonreligion. However, it can also be argued that since nonreligion is an option
today that the Establishment Clause has to treat equally with the religious those
for whom religious questions hold no significance and those who are anti-religious,
since they all compete on the same level as ways of life. That is, the Constitution
cannot favor religious ways of life over nonreligious ones, and so neutrality must
be maintained among all comprehensive views and the lack of any.
36 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. This principle has been affirmed as recently as
the last Term. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
37 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989).
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government can neither advance nor hinder the cause of religion.38 In short, our government ''has no authority whatsoever
in religious matters."39
This neutrality, however, means that the First Amendment
is not neutral to all types of religion. The Framers' position
entails a value judgment as to the nature of our society: our
society is to be pluralistic, not theocratic. Therefore, the Establishment Clause will conflict with those religious ways of life
that advocate a theocratic society. In a theocracy, the government reflects one set of religious beliefs and values-the
country's laws will be "God's laws," or our country will be declared to be a "Christian nation" (or the equivalent for another
tradition). 40 But in adopting the Establishment Clause, the
Framers denied that the government would advocate one revelation or one religious way of life as privileged. Even if we
could somehow determine one religious tradition to be the "true
religion," we have nevertheless chosen to structure our country
so as not to live in a theocracy. In the words of Justice Felix
Frankfurter, this clause withdraws "from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the
verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in
action of that belief or disbelief."41
All religious advocacy in our system becomes a matter
exclusively for private parties. This does not mean, however,
that religion is thereby relegated to the sphere of the purely
private, but only that, unlike in a theocracy, no religion is to be
proclaimed or otherwise endorsed by the government as the
true religion or denounced as false. Thus, America is not a
Christian nation de jure, no matter what the religion of the majority of the populace, and attempts to translate religious values into public policy will be limited by the requirements of the
Establishment Clause. 42
38 That this clause also protects religion from intervention by the government is often overlooked. As the Supreme Court recently said: "The First
Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression
are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." Weisman, 112
S. Ct. at 2656.
39 THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 215 (1986).
40 See discussion supra part LB.
41 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 at 465-66 (1961).
42 The need for a nontheocratic purpose or justification (discussed infra in
part II.B) is particularly great since there is a dominant de facto religious majority
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This neutrality is often labelled "secularity," but that label
is deceptive. The problem once again is what exactly "secular"
means. The Establishment Clause forbids governmental hostility toward religion. 43 The Supreme Court's comment about a
"secular state" reflects this: "A secular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an atheistic or anti-religious state. A
secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its
official creed."44 Thus, it is more accurate to refer to a state
under the Establishment Clause as pluralistic or neutral rather
than secular. For the issue at hand, the most important consequence of this is that, as far as the government is concerned,
the political arena is pluralistic, not free from religion.

2.

Separation of the institutions of church and state

The second presupposition relates to the first. The First
Amendment neither defines the phrase "respecting an establishment" nor what constitutes a "religion." It does not use the
words "church" and "state," a dichotomy introduced into our jurisprudence later by Thomas Jefferson. 45 However, despite the
clause's broad language, most scholars agree that the Framers'
concern was with taxes and other support for churches. 46 That
is, "establishment" involves governmental financial or symbolic
support for institutions (i.e., Christian churches or

in our society. Guarding minorities against the danger of the possible "tyranny of
the majority" is central to the First Amendment. See Jones, supra note 35, at 402.
Courts must invalidate a law, no matter how popular that law might be, if the
argument for it is based exclusively on the religious authorities of one or more
religious groups.
43 The government may not interfere with the role of religion in society-hostility toward religion is an effect as prohibited under the Establishment
Clause as aid for religion. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
Secularists may argue that by eliminating all references to basic frames of reference they are treating religious persons neutrally. See discussion infra part IV.B.
However, in requiring that political debate be carried on in secular terms, they are
not being neutral. Use of nonreligious language is not the lowest common denominator between competing ways of life but instead reflect
specific
belief-commitments. (No attempt at a lowest common denominator would satisfy everyone since it would not reflect the full commitment of faith which the participants would require.) Not only would religion not be treated neutrally in the language of political debate under the secularists' vision, but the secularists could (not
surprisingly) use their own frameworks without adjustment, unlike the religious
participants.
44 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
45 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citing Letter to
Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1800)).
46 CURRY, supra note 39, at 120.
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non-Christian equivalents); it does not involve more generally
the religious beliefs and practices of individuals. 47 The prohibition against favoring one religion over another or aiding all
religions, therefore, must be interpreted as a prohibition
against promoting religious institutions, not a restriction on the
religious beliefs and actions of individual people.
The consequence for the issue at hand is that the institutions of church and state are to be kept separated, but no such
constitutional requirement exists for the activities of religion
and politics. The difference is that religious commitments can
inform people's positions on public matters, while the institutions of church and state remain distinct. Religious commitments of religious citizens may influence government action,
but there is no identification of church with state. This differs
from a theocracy in that, even if a church endorses a particular
position, the governmental action must be justified on
nontheocratic grounds. 48 Thus, the Establishment Clause does
not relegate religion to a strictly private role in persons'
lives-religion's public function is permitted to flourish.
Nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions suggests a separation of religion and politics. Even a strict separation of institutions has not been consistently maintained by the Court.
Accommodationist justices often argue that the First Amendment, in the words of Justice William 0. Douglas, "does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
Church and State. Otherwise the state and religion would be
aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."49 Allowing some accommodation by government of citizen's
religious interests merely reflects, in the words of the Supreme
Court, the "common sense" of the matter-the state's "callous
indifference" toward religion was never intended by the Establishment Clause. 5° Former Chief Justice Burger put the point
this way:
No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation

47 Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1615-25 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the
'Secular': Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 962-71
(1989).
48 See discussion infra part II.B.
49 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
50 ld. at 314.

358

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

from all the other parts, much less from government. It has
never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a
regime of total separation. Nor does the Constitution require
complete separation of church and state. 5 1

Even separationist justices accept some accommodations. 52

3. Role for religion in American public life
The second presupposition is supported by the third: the
Founders, as evidenced by the acts of the early federal government, valued the social role of religion and did not intend to
make religion absolutely separate from government. Many, although not all, of the Founders were profoundly religious and
their consensus was that religion and morality were essential
for the survival of the Republic. In the words of George Washington from his Farewell Address: "Of all the dispositions and
habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality
are indispensable supports."53 The actions of the First Congress also show that the Founders did not intend the Establishment Clause to bar all government support of religion in its
public capacity. 54 For example, the oft-cited Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789 in providing for schools refers to religion, along with morality and knowledge, as ''being necessary
to good government and the happiness of mankind."55
In sum, the Establishment Clause operates in a society in
which religion has a public function and it merely prohibits the
establishment of one or more particular religions. The implication here is that reliance upon religious commitments (other
than theocratic ones) in political matters is constitutional.
Separationists who are hostile to religion in general or to its
public expression may disagree; but other separationists, along

51 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (citation omitted).
52 See e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2465-67 (1993).
53 Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, reprinted in RUSSELL E.
RICHEY & DONALD G. JONES, EDS., AMERICAN CNIL RELIGION (1974), at 26. As
Bellah notes, the words may be Alexander Hamilton's.
54 Douglas Laycock, 'Non-Preferential' Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY 1. REV. 875, 909 (1986).
55 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 51, 52 (1789). Citing actions of the First Congress
for evidence of the intent of the Framers is problematic-some of their actions
were unconstitutional. But those actions are some indication of the general atmosphere of the time.
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with accommodationists, will agree that reliance on such religious commitments does not raise a constitutional issue. The
issue instead turns to how we distinguish theocratic from
nontheocratic actions.

B. Determining if Governmental Action Is Constitutional
The principal test developed by the Supreme Court to determine if a governmental action is constitutional is set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman in three prongs: the action (1) must have a
legitimate secular purpose, (2) must not have the principal or
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3)
must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. 56 Any attempt to restrict religious commitments as a
source of political action would no doubt be decided under this
test. 5 7
Focusing here on the "secular purpose" requirement is
sufficient to see the problems for the issue at hand (although it
must be remembered that the effect and entanglement requirements also need to be satisfied). Under this purpose requirement, the question is whether the government's "actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." 58 The Supreme
Court has summarized the analysis as follows:
A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when
the State enacts a law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general,
or by advancement of a particular religious belief .... While
the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a

56 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Despite profound criticism of each prong by
members of the Court and by commentators, the Lemon test is still alive. See
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2148
(1993); 113 S.Ct. at 2149-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57 Other Establishment Clause tests apply only in more specialized circumstances, not general political discourse. See Richard H. Jones, "In God We Trust"
and the Establishment Clause, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 381, 404-10 (1989).
58 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch advanced an influential "endorsement" test for the purpose requirement: the question becomes whether the governmental action "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." 465 U.S. at 688. Any governmental
action that singles out all religious persons in their political activities from the
nonreligious, as the secularists would, would fail under this test by sending a message to the religious that they are outsiders.
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secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere and not a sham.59

What the Court has not made clear is what exactly is "secular" and what exactly is a "purpose." Kent Greenawalt proposes the seemingly innocuous requirement that the purpose cannot be, for example, to end "sinfulness," but must identify
"some genuine damage to individuals or society (or other entities)."60 However, the problem here is that people will disagree over what exactly is genuine damage. The answer will
depend upon one's frame of reference: some religious persons
will think that sinfulness is as genuine and objective as any
physical or psychological damage-it may be less tangible, but
it is no less real. 61 Similarly, people will disagree over what is
the public good to be achieved for the society as a whole, and
consequently over what constitutes harm. All legislation necessarily reflects particular background beliefs and values. 62
Thus, it is difficult to attempt to limit the scope of governmental action only to what everyone agrees is genuine damage
precisely because the real political dilemmas over such social
issues as abortion arise only where there is fundamental disagreement at the time over underlying beliefs.

1. Defining "religious purpose"
The disagreement leads to the larger issue of defining a
religious purpose. What the anti-religious consider a "religious"
purpose may not appear particularly religious to the faithful.
Perhaps no one can neatly segregate all elements of their own
way of life into "religious" and "nonreligious" segments. What
appears to one who participates in a certain way of life to be
simply "the way things really are" may appear to an outsider
as unwarranted, speculative assumptions. The same holds for
values within a way of life: to an insider, the values do not
appear to be "religious," they are simply objective facts, grounded in reality, by which we all ought to live. For example, for
the religious, morality is no more "secular" than "religious."

59 Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 585-87 (citations omitted).
60 REUGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 94.
61 See discussion infra part IV.B., concerning frameworks of belief.
62 Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 403 (1963).
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In addition, religious people are as divided on political
issues as the nonreligious-there is no one "religious" position
on any major social/political issue. Therefore, whatever action
the government takes will have to coincide with the values and
goals of some religious people. But "that the Judea-Christian
religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the
Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny."63 As the Supreme Court has often noted, harmonizing with a religious
position on a social issue (such as abortion) is not sufficient to
render a governmental action unconstitutional, as long as the
action has a valid secular justification. 64 Indeed, there have
been religious justifications for any political position (e.g., before the Civil War, both for and against slavery),65 and there
will always be a religious purpose to be satisfied on both sides
of any controversial issue. In such circumstances, defining a
purpose as secular is not a simple matter. 66 As Laurence Tribe
states: "If a purpose were to be classified as non-secular simply
because the resulting state practice coincided with the beliefs of
a religion, or because it originated in a religion, then virtually
nothing that government does would be acceptable."67
Thus, in the context of the Establishment Clause, "secular"
cannot mean simply "not religious." A more appropriate standard for the requirement of secularity should therefore be
merely a restatement of the anti-theocracy requirement: the
government's purpose must be more than simply trying to align
society with some religious vision. The theocrats' political goal
is to impose their religious authority on people outside the
group. This is precisely what the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from doing. 68
However, one may nevertheless argue religiously without
being theocratic. Such arguments would be grounded in the
beliefs and values of a particular religious way of life but would
not consist solely of the fact that certain religious authorities
require the governmental action. For example, the religious
may advocate laws against murder out of a concern with the
63 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980).
64 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 603 n.8 (1988); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 682 (1984); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
65 See RELIGION AND SLAVERY xi-xiii (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
66 Smith, supra note 47, at 999-1007.
67 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9 (2d ed. 1988).
68 See discussion supra part II.A.
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ultimate significance (as defined by that religion's belief-framework) of each human life; such arguments need not be either
theocratically-based (i.e., solely invoking what the religious
authorities require) or "secular" in the sense of not being tied
to the dimension of ultimate meaning in a religious way of life.
The religious arguments for an action need not convince the
nonreligious or appeal to members of other religious groups.
But the Establishment Clause prohibits a governmental action
whose only support is merely that the authorities of one or
more religious groups require it. Operationally, this means that
the religious cannot rest their arguments exclusively with Biblical or other religious decrees.
Thus, a religious purpose for a governmental action is legitimate, but its support cannot be limited to the religious
authority of a group. 69 Therefore, "secular" in this context
means simply any argument not justified exclusively by reference to a religious community's authority (such as a revelation
embodied in a fundamental text) or to some private insight or
other personal religious experience, not the opposition with all
things religious. 70
In short, if we continue to use the concept of "secularity,"
then "secular" in the context of the Establishment Clause
means simply "nontheocratic." Any other "religious" elements to
a justification or to the identification of a social harm are "secular" in this regard. This suggests once again that the dichotomy
between religious and secular is at best unhelpful and that
some other concept (such as "neutral" or" pluralistic") should be
used instead of "secular" in defining this prong of the Lemon
test.

69 The purpose requirement cannot be simply that an action is for the good
of everyone or open to all people, since theocrats would argue that that is precisely
what they also want. Like most political advocates, theocrats would say that what
they advocate is good for all of society and open to all who wish to join, and that
their authorities are in fact open to all to adopt. See also discussion infra note
116.
70 See discussion supra part I.B. Audi defines a "secular reason" as "one
whose normative force ... does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God .
. . or on theological considerations." The Separation of Church and State, supra
note 1, at 278. However, this definition would apparently remove all of religion.
For example, are all moral considerations by a religious person within a moral
religious way of life "theological considerations?" A religious person would certainly
think so. Secularists cannot simply separate out what they value and call it "secular."
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2. Defining "purpose"
Turning to the second problem-the absence of a definition
of "purpose"-difficulties resurface. Purpose is distinguished by
the Court as different from effect (what actually results from a
governmental action) but is not otherwise characterized. 71 The
term "purpose" is open to many different meanings: it may
mean purpose proper (the goal or objective to be achieved),
motive (why we are doing the action), justification or rationale
(the reasons or evidence for defending the purpose as valuable
for all members of society), or argumentation (the presentation
or advocacy of the justification). These various concepts, while
related, must be distinguished. The Supreme Court, however,
has not clearly distinguished the purpose from the motive or
rationale for an act. In particular, the Supreme Court has
found legislation in four cases to be unconstitutional for violating only the purpose requirement when the Court focused
primarily upon the legislators' motives. 72
If the various concepts packed into the purpose requirement are separated, the interpretation which best captures the
purpose requirement is: (1) the predominant goal or objective
for the governmental action must be clearly secular; 73 or (2) if
the goal or objective is ambiguous, then the government must

71 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
72 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-95 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 57, 60 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 43 (1980); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-8 (1968) (pre-Lemon case utilizing the same purpose
requirement). Each of these cases would have the same result under the refinement of the purpose requirement proposed here, since no "secular" purposes or
justifications (other than shams) were advanced. In none of these cases does the
Supreme Court ever clearly differentiate motive from objective (purpose). For example, in Ja(free, the Court said "the First Amendment requires that a statute must
be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." 472
U.S. at 56. Whether anyone is "entirely motivated" by any one source is questionable, and mixing motive and purpose here only confuses the issue more.
73 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2654 (1992) ("clearly secular purpose").
How much nonreligious purpose is enough? The Supreme Court has not been clear
concerning whether any legitimate nonreligious purpose, no matter how insignificant, is sufficient to render an action constitutional (as suggested by Ja(free, 472
U.S. at 56, where the Court stated that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion; cf Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 602 (1988); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)), or whether the religious purpose must predominate to find the action unconstitutional (Aguillard, 482
U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., concurring)). The latter position appears to be more realistic: the Establishment Clause should not turn on simply finding any insignificant
nonreligious purpose. In short, the theocratic purpose must not predominate to the
exclusion of other purposes.
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advance a clearly secular justification (the set of reasons showing why the purpose should be achieved) sufficient to support
the action. "Secular" here is used in the narrow
(anti-theocratic) sense, discussed above in this section, which
requires that revelations in religious texts or personal religious
experiences are not the only justifications for the government's
action. The first condition requires that if an action's purpose is
primarily theocratic (in that it has no goal or objective other
than attempting to align society with some religious vision),
then the action is unconstitutional; justifications are irrelevant.
The second condition comes into play only if the government's
stated goal is not clearly secular. Such a circumstance occurs
when the objectives are mixed, i.e., both theocratic and
nontheocratic objectives exist for an act. The nontheocratic
justification must be genuine and sufficient enough to withstand a court challenge: just as there may be sham purposes
contrived only to try to satisfy the Lemon test, so may the
courts have to determine if a purported secular justification
does in fact justify the action or is merely contrived for the
sake of appearance. 74
The problem of sham objectives in politics is very real. In
such cases, courts must decide which is the predominant objective. Sanford Levinson poses a problem in this regard which
is the opposite of the usual problem of religious purposes disguised as secular. 75 What if legislation with a genuine secular
objective is clothed in religious garb, e.g., an environmental
protection act entitled "The Stewardship of God's Creation Act
of 1993?" Under the interpretation of the purpose requirement
proposed here, if the primary objective clearly is narrowly theocratic (i.e., having no purpose other than to align society with a
religious vision), as would appear to be the case from its title
and preamble, then the statute would be unconstitutional despite its secular value. The second condition (a clearly

74 It should be noted that courts have accepted sacrilegious purposes (e.g.,
promoting tourism and sales by use of Christian symbols during the Christmas
season) as satisfying the purpose requirement. E.g., ACLU v. Rabun County, 698
F.2d 1098, 1109 (11th Cir. 1983). Courts may be similarly lenient with regard to
the secular justification requirement. In any case, something of a philosophical
judgment is required in determining what is the "primary" purpose and what is a
sufficient justification.
75 Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 2061, 2071-73 (1992) (book review).
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nontheocratic justification) would not be considered since the
statute's purpose is not ambiguous.
Most importantly, under the interpretation proposed here,
the motive of the individual legislator or other government
official is always irrelevant. 76 Motives, even more than objectives, will probably be mixed-we seldom act for any one motive. They are also more difficult to discern. Secularists may
feel that determining the motivation of religious persons is a
simple matter-that religious faith is always the sole source
shaping and controlling other beliefs, but that is not always so.
Consider William Jennings Bryan's fundamentalism and his
opposition to evolution. Prior to World War I, he was neutral
on the issue of evolution. But after the war, he concluded that
the evolutionary doctrines of Darwin and Nietzsche were the
cause of the war. He then began to oppose evolution and also
took a more fundamentalist turn in his religion. 77 Thus, what
might appear to be a simplistic religious opposition to science
was actually more complex. Politics was a motive for the
change in religious belief, not vice versa.
Motives may involve psycho-social causes and various rationales that are hard to distinguish, and, more importantly,
are simply irrelevant to the purpose and effect of the governmental action. The motive for supporting some legislation may
be primarily to get re-elected or to please family and friends.
Even if some legislators act purely from religious motives, their
acts would be held constitutional as long as one of the two conditions above is fulfilled. 78 Thus, motives do not need to be
analyzed at all since they are irrelevant to assessing the value

76 The interpretation proposed here would modify the requirement in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595 (1987), that if a religious motive is shown,
then the advocates of the challenged action must show that the action would nevertheless have been undertaken even in the absence of such motivation. Instead,
the requirement should be that even if a theocratic motive is shown, the action is
constitutional if there is a legitimate nontheocratic purpose or justification. The
action may not have been undertaken in the absence of theocratic motivation, but
it would still be constitutional under such circumstances.
77 See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GoD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 101-05
(1990).
78 To apply this principle to another area: judges who are permitted to exercise their discretion and who are acting within sentencing guidelines should be
allowed to rely upon their (nontheocratic) religious convictions. But see United
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting this position).
Compare Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1083
(1990), with Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 932, 943 (1989), and RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 239-41.

366

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

of the proposed governmental action. 79 The psychological or
social factors animating our motivations are not related closely
enough to the public purpose or effect of an action to be a relevant consideration. We need not find the "real" reasons or causes for wanting an act if the purpose is secular (i.e.,
nontheocratic), or if the purpose is unclear, the justification is
secular. Certainly requiring, as Robert Audi would, a "secular
motivation" for advocating any public policy is unnecessary if
either of the two conditions is satisfied. 80 His position reflects
more an unabashed prejudice against religion than any constitutional requirement. No motive, unlike purposes and justifications, is constitutional or unconstitutional, and attempting to
restrain motives unnecessarily restricts the religious. 81 In
short, no motive is illegitimate or impermissible, no matter how
dominant and apparent-only the purpose and justification
matter.
Finally, the argumentation for the secular purpose may be
anything the arguer thinks will be persuasive. It is the purpose
or justification that must satisfy the two conditions, not the
argumentation. The difference between justification and argumentation lies between a rigorous presentation of the rationale
for a position (the justification) and the marshalling of whatever reasons one wishes to advance for a position (the argumenta79 It is not clear what sense can be made of the concept of the collective
motive of legislators or citizens. For a discussion of the problems of delving into
legislators' subjective motives, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 614-17
(1987); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 18-23 (1985); Hal Culberton,
Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, U. ILL. L.
REV. 924-5 (1990) (legislative purpose as legal fiction). In the absence of a clear
concept, keeping motive out of constitutional analysis can only help. Certainly dealing with purposes and justifications is at least somewhat more "objective" in the
sense of being more open to discernment and consensus.
80 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 284. Audi defines
his principle of secular motivation as "one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one . . . is . . . motivated
by adequate secular reason . . . ." !d. He does allow motivation by religious considerations as well, as long as there is an adequate or sufficient set of secular reasons. !d. This principle is for him an additional requirement to a secular rationale
for advocating a public policy. !d. at 279.
81 When people cannot advance legitimate secular (nontheocratic) purposes or
reasons for a political position, we can safely say that they are motivated solely by
religion. Thus, in this narrow usage, "religious motive" is simply another way of
saying "no legitimate secular justification," and so "religious motivation" in this
limited sense would be unconstitutional. But religious motivation in the more usual
sense of the phrase-i.e., religious commitments motivating a political position-is
as constitutional as any motivation when the secular purpose requirement is fulfilled.
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tion). The former is a more limited enterprise, while the latter
encompasses any free-wheeling debate tactic.
Thus, participants in political debates may rely in their
argumentation on religious sources if they think that, as a
practical matter, the religious sources help the argument. Like
anyone else, religious participants may choose, for tactical
reasons, to present only some of their reasons and to leave out
what they think will not be persuasive to anyone outside their
religious group. 82 Common sense dictates that quoting the Bible will not convince atheists, and that one's argument should
be selected according to one's audience. Most arguments on
social issues by religious people in disputes with persons outside their religious group may in fact be indistinguishable from
arguments by the nonreligious, if they can be confined to the
level of political actions alone and not involve the underlying
bases for holding the different positions. 83 But if Christian
fundamentalists want to assert a Biblical basis for an act that
has a secular (nontheocratic) objective or justification, they
may. There is no need to advance only reasons that supposedly
all citizens would accept, even if such arguments were possible.84
Similarly, it is perfectly legitimate (contra Audi) to use as
justifications, reasons that do not personally motivate the
arguer. 85 The religious may advance reasons that are acceptable to their nonreligious opponents to try to convince them. As
long as one finds those reasons legitimate, there is nothing
hypocritical or deceitful in only advancing arguments that one
thinks are legitimate and will convince one's opponent, even if
the arguments are not part of the proposed justification for the
action. 86 Such tactics are constitutional-deciding to restrict
the range of one's arguments is different from imposing restrictions on the permissible purpose or justification for a govern-

82 E.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-49 (1990).
83 Whether this is possible is questionable. See discussion infra part IV.B.
84 See discussion infra part IV.B.
85 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 282. Compare RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 220 (effective political discourse does not
require full disclosure of all personal judgments and other bases upon which a
decision is reached) and Some Further Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1023, 1046.
86 One might go even further and argue that one may use arguments one
does not in fact accept. For example, secularists could study the Bible in order to
try to convince Christian fundamentalists on biblical grounds that they are wrong
on a political issue. Either side might use arguments that only appeal to the other
side in such circumstances.
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mental action. 87 Politics is comparable to arguing in court,
with extremely broad rules of evidence, in this regard: as long
as what the law requires is fulfilled (the nontheocratic purpose
or justification), there is wide latitude toward what evidence is
marshalled for use and what strategy is chosen to convince the
jury (the argumentation).
Thus, religious argumentation is constitutional. Christian
fundamentalists, like everyone else (including secularists), need
not disclose their motives but only their purposes and justifications for the proposed actions. In this way, religious discourse
has a legitimate place in the public political arena, even if
governmental actions cannot be for "religious" purposes and
reasons (in the narrow theocratic sense discussed earlier in this
section).
This requirement for constitutionality is a modest one.
Most governmental actions should pass the purpose requirement. The only actions that would fail are those for which
there is no secular (nontheocratic) predominant purpose or
sufficient justification, i.e., the actions' defenders can only advance religious texts embodying revelation or personal experiences as purposes or justifications. Such an action would gain
majority support normally only in communities in which most
of the population belongs to the same religious group. For example, in a town in Missouri where dancing violated religious
tenets of the majority, a ban on school dances was upheld by
the school board even though no secular (nontheocratic) purpose or justification was articulated at trial. 88 On a larger social scale, however, the population is more pluralistic, and so
arguments with wider appeal than the narrow theocratic ones
usually must be advanced in order to gain majority support for
a governmental action (although exceptions, such as the legislation at issue in Epperson v. Arkansas 89 and Edwards v.
Aguillard, 90 have occurred).

87 All that should be excluded from politics is deception or dishonesty concerning proposed actions, purposes, or justifications. That is, we should not conceal
our true political program but be forthright about our positions on issues, regardless of our motives and total arguments for them.
88 The district court held the school board's action to be unconstitutional,
but the court was reversed on appeal, even though the court of appeal did not
identify any secular purpose. Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850 (W.D.
Mo. 1988), rev'd, 884 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990).
89 393
97 (1968).
90 482 u.s. 578 (1987).

u.s.
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Ill. RELIGION IN POLITICS
The conclusions of parts I and II are as follows: First, religious ways of life are not purely private matters but have a social/political dimension, and not all religious persons are committed to the theocratic option in politics. Second, the Establishment Clause does not require a religiously sterile public
life, and, more particularly, it does not prohibit all reliance on
religious commitments in the political arena-the usual dichotomy between "secular" and "religious" does not adequately
analyze the issues. Under the purpose requirement of the Lemon test for constitutionality, political positions may be maintained for religious reasons as long as their predominant purposes are secular (in the sense of not being theocratic, i.e., not
exclusively based on religious revelations and personal experiences), or if the purpose is ambiguous, the positions have a
sufficient secular justification. In short, revelation or other religious authority is a legitimate source of political ideas and
justifications, but more must be advanced by the religious as
justification than simply that their religion requires aligning
society with a religious way of life.
In the context of politics, this interpretation means that
only theocrats, who want to impose God's law or another
religion's equivalent upon believers and nonbelievers, would be
advocating unconstitutional positions because they assert and
rely only upon what they take to be revealed rather than advance other purposes or justifications.
The final step in the argument is to show that the Establishment Clause is the only restriction we should recognize in
this democracy on the issue of religion in political life. The
principal argument in favor of this position is simply to note
the absence of either any other legal restrictions (except for two
to be mentioned shortly) or of any plausible alternative interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the context of politics.
Perry and Audi frame their discussions of religion in politics as "ideals" for a democratic society to be voluntarily chosen
rather than to be imposed by force of law. 91 But, if we ignore
the Establishment Clause or some other legal framework, it is
difficult to make sense of what restrictions these theorists

91 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 276, 283; Religious
Commitment, supra note 1, at 76; PERRY, supra note 2, at 137. See discussion infra
part IV.C.
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propose. 92 What are they talking about if not the legal framework of this society? Mter we determine what actions are permitted under the law, what is left? What other type of restrictions can our society impose? What other type of sanctions? In
short, if we do not voluntarily adopt the restrictions of the
secularist ideals, what recourse do the secularists propose?
They may feel our society would be better if everyone accepted
secular ideals as political conventions. For this, they would
have to argue that a society with no religion in the public forum is better than our existing society.
Indeed, it would be very difficult to defend other restrictions on religious political speech. The Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment restricts the government from limiting
the right of the religious to participate in politics. 93 The Free
Speech Clause only enhances the protection of religious speech
in public. According to the Supreme Court, public debate of
political issues is to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."94
Political speech is the paradigm of what is protected under the
First Amendment, and all political speech-including religious
political speech-is on the same footing in the marketplace of
ideas. This means that religious persons may advocate any
position in any way they choose (within the court-interpreted
restrictions on their Free Speech rights). The restriction of the
Establishment Clause is that governmental action must have a
secular purpose or justification (in the narrow anti-theocratic
sense of "secular") 95 to withstand a court challenge. But no
political speech can be excluded simply because it is religious.
Two qualifications must be noted here. First, Article VI,
Clause 3 of the Constitution prohibits any "religious test" for
holding public office. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation

92 William Marshall is more explicit about the absence of a legal basis for
the secularists' restrictions. He concedes that religious involvement "is not formally
constitutionally proscribed" and that "informal constraint has no legal effect." Yet
he still feels that "there is something improper about religion's involvement in politics." The Other Side of Religion, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993). He articulates no
basis for restricting all religious involvement. Greenawalt also argues that no one
is proposing legal restrictions on religious people but about "political ethics," i.e.,
about how people should act. The Role of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Dilemmas and Possible Resolutions, 35 J. CHURCH & ST. 503, 505-06 (1993).
93 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (right of religious ministers to hold
office).
94 !d. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring)(quoting New York v. Sullivan, 376
u.s. 254, 270 (1964)).
95 See discussion supra part II.B.
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in Torcaso v. Watkins, this prevents "probing religious beliefs
by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or
perhaps, more properly, profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept."96 In effect, this clause reduces
to one special application of the Establishment Clause under
the interpretation advocated here.
Second, a distinction must be made in one respect between
religious individuals and religious institutions. Under federal
law, tax-exempt organizations may keep their tax-exempt status only if no "substantial" part of their activities "is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... , and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office."97 In short, religious and nonreligious organizations must choose between a tax-exempt status and legislative
lobbying or involving themselves directly in political camprugns.
This latter restriction, however, does not apply to individual members of such organizations (although it is not always
clear when a member of a religious group is speaking individually or for the organization). Nor does it apply to religious organizations that do not claim tax-exempt status. For those
groups and for individuals, only the Establishment Clause provides a restriction on religion in politics. Even tax-exempt organizations under the above-cited statute may take stands on
moral and social questions that are current campaign issues as
long as they do not lobby or directly participate in a specific
political campaign (e.g., endorsing a specific candidate). In this
way, religious groups may influence public policy and the political process in general.
With these qualifications in mind, the Establishment
Clause remains the only major limitation against relying on
religious convictions in politics. Religious political speech cannot be treated differently from other forms of political speech.
In the words of former Justice William Brennan, "Religionists

96 367 u.s. 488, 494 (1961).
97 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986); see Legislative Activity by Certain Types of
Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 99, 282-312 (1972) (comments by religious organizations). Religion
is not discriminated against here since this restriction applies to all tax-exempt
organizations.
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no less than members of any other group enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political
activity generally."98 Professor Tribe summarizes the situation:
American courts have not thought the separation of church
and state to require that religion be totally oblivious to government or politics; church and religious groups in the United
States have long exerted powerful political pressures on state
and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as slavery,
war, gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and education. To view such religious activity as suspect, or to regard
its political results as automatically tainted, might be inconsistent with first amendment freedoms of religious and political expression. 99

There is no other legal restriction on the admission of
religion to the public arena. Indeed, as mentioned above, the
Establishment Clause is only a restriction on governmental
action, not on private advocacy. It restricts what can be advocated only in the sense that in order for an advocated act to
withstand a constitutional challenge, it must have a purpose or
justification which is secular (nontheocratic). 100
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH SECULARISTS' VISIONS FOR SOCIETY

Because the Establishment Clause is the controlling principle, issues raised by Audi, Perry, Greenawalt, and others-such
as acceptable versus unacceptable religious beliefs, or public
versus religious reasoning101-simply dissolve. But there are
certain legal and philosophical problems with the secularists'
positions, even as ideals for society, that must be pointed out.

A.

Fallibilism and Politics

Michael Perry sets forth a vision of an "ecumenical politics"
in which some persons with religious convictions may rely on

98 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 866-67 (1978) (cited
in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 641 n.25 (Brennan, J., concurring)). More recently, Justice Scalia put the point succinctly: "political activism by the religiously
motivated is part of our heritage." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
100 See discussion supra part II.B.
101 See, for example, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 49-76, for
further discussion.
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those convictions both in motivating political choices and in
publicly debating those choices. 102 Nevertheless, Perry does
not treat all religious convictions equally: two attitudes are essential for membership in the ecumenical political dialogue-pluralism and fallibilism.

1. Pluralism
Pluralism is, in effect, merely accepting dialogue rather
than the dogmatic assertions of one's position. 103 Theocrats,
who do not recognize the possible legitimacy of other positions,
would thus be eliminated from politics, as would any
nontheocrats who accept nontheocratic purposes and justifications but are nevertheless dogmatic. Nonetheless, not all
religiously-based citizens who take their religious faith seriously are dogmatic with regard to how other people should lead
their lives, and many allow a difference of positions on political
issues. Such people should be able to accept democratic processes on political issues. Perry's requirement indicates one of the
secularists' prejudices against religion-that all religious persons are dogmatic about their beliefs. 104
Secularists believe religious people are not open to the
possibility of nontheocratic forms of government; instead, the
religious vote with one voice as their dogmatic leaders instruct
them. A recent remark by Justice Harry Blackmun suggests
this position:
Democracy requires the nourishment of dialogue and dissent,
while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human deliberation. When the government
appropriates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate
into theological decree.' Those who disagree no longer are
questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules of
a higher authority who is beyond reproach. 105

102 PERRY, supra note 2, at 112.
103 !d. at 110.
104 Many religious persons have genuine doubts about the certainty of their
beliefs and how to lead their lives while still remaining committed to that way of
life. But this does not mean that Perry is correct about self-critical "faith" versus
"belief"-the religious are not any closer to holding an abstract faith because of
their doubts. Their concrete religious values and beliefs, not some abstract faith,
remain the substance of their ways of life and of their doubts.
105 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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To have all religious believers alike in this matter is unlikely
(e.g., religious groups disagree over official prayers in schools;
and not all Roman Catholics vote against pro-choice candidates). This position does not take into account the striking
diversity of religious political views exemplified by the contrast
between Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson. 106 In addition,
whether religious believers are in fact any more intransigent in
their political beliefs than those nonreligious persons who are
serious about their own beliefs and values is a matter for empirical investigation.
Our constitutional rights in this regard do not turn on an
empirical inquiry. Anyone, religious or nonreligious, who feels
the irrefutable rightness of his or her position may still enter
the political arena. To pass constitutional muster, they must
advance purposes or justifications for their position which are
secular in the anti-theocratic sense. Even theocrats, with their
appeals to revelation or personal experiences, can legitimately
enter political debates on one issue: whether to amend the
Constitution to abolish the Establishment Clause and create a
theocracy. The theocrats' appeal to revelation is constitutionally
problematic because of their views on the nature of government,
not because of any dogmatic assertion that their political position is not open to debate or vote: it is the political program
constituting an integral part of the theocrats' way of life that is
in conflict with the Establishment Clause, not how their hold
their faith. Nothing in the history of the Establishment Clause
or its jurisprudence suggests that the modern liberal/secularist
reading of the First Amendment requires an allegiance by
citizens to rational debate, so that those who would advocate
religious grounds for public policy must defend their convictions by appeal to considerations that can be assessed by all
members of the public. 107 The intent of the Establishment
Clause is to eliminate the possibility of a theocracy, but not to
otherwise limit participation in the processes of governing.

106 Cf PETER L. BENSON & DOROTHY L. WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITOL
HILL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 123-39, 143-48 (1982) (diversity of politicians' religious
views correlated with a wide variety of political beliefs).
107 Contra Franklin I. Gamwell, Religwn and Reason 1n Amencan Politics, 2
J.L. & RELIGION 325 (1984). Some of the Founders were heavily influenced by the
Enlightenment, but not all who framed and ratified the First Amendment were;
and nothing in the history of the Establishment Clause suggests that the Enlightenment rationality was to play a central role in what was being required of
the citizenry.
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Fallibilism

Perry's second requirement-fallibilism-presents a greater problem. He characterizes this attitude as the ideal of
self-critical rationality (exemplified in the sciences) in which
one holds one's fundamental beliefs open to scrutiny, revision,
and possible rejection. 108 According to fallibilism, only people
who hold their religious faith open to such self-criticism would
be permitted to participate in the political arena.
Two objections to this argument, one legal and one philosophical, present themselves immediately. First, the Establishment Clause under every interpretation prohibits discrimination among religions, 109 with the qualification that it does discriminate against those religious persons whose political program is incompatible with the anti-establishment requirement
itself (i.e., advocates of theocracies).uo Under Perry's proposal, the religious would be divided on the basis of the very nature of the religious commitment, not upon whether their political programs conflict with the Constitution. Any proposal that
would exclude the political speech of some religious persons
while permitting that of others could not be enforceable in any
way. Distinguishing "true" from "false" religions in any respect
is simply not a matter for the government.
In addition, fallibilism has another substantial problem:
most religious people simply do not consider their faith in such
terms. While the religious may have doubts about their particular way of life or even concede the theoretical possibility of
error, they still remain committed to that way of life. Perry
may be able to find a few liberal academics who shape their
faith in a fallibilistic manner, but to require such a standard
would exclude the vast majority of religious Americans. People,
religious and nonreligious, simply do not hold their fundamental beliefs open to such self-critical analysis.
Moreover, people need not hold their fundamental beliefs
open to such criticism in order to participate in our public life.
Fallibilism may be the appropriate attitude in a philosophical
discussion or in a dialogue between religious faiths, but it is
totally irrelevant to politics. All that is needed to participate in
our political arena is a willingness to accept secular
108 PERRY, supra note 2, at 110.
109 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 246-52 (1982).
110 See dis(.-ussion supra part II.A.
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(nontheocratic) purposes and justifications for governmental
actions. This does not mean that we must be willing to question our own belief-framework, but only that we accept a
nontheocratic government. It is a matter of accepting the nature of our country, not about the nature of one's religious
commitment.
Theocrats would be excluded from the political arena, but
other religious persons who hold firmly to their faith would not
be excluded as long as they accept that this republic is based
on a pluralism of faiths (and non-belief), and is not simply a
mirror of one religious vision. For example, Roman Catholics
need not doubt their church's official position on issues of abortion, divorce, and conception, and they may even work to
change the laws regarding these issues so that they reflect
Roman Catholic beliefs, but they must accept the secular purpose and justification requirements of the Establishment
Clause. The issue is what actions one would require of people
outside one's own faith. 111 For that, there is no requirement
that we have to question our fundamental beliefs as applied to
our own lives or to hold them open to doubt. Being open to persuasion about how the country is to be run may be a prerequisite to participating in politics, but being open to, in effect, a
religious conversion is not.
In short, Perry's fallibilism is impossible from a practical
standpoint and unnecessary from a legal standpoint. Perry's
fallibilism, combined with his distinction between faith and
belief, 11lJroduces a lop-sided compromise between religious
and anti-religious extremes that would allow only certain religious persons to be heard-that is, only those religious persons
whose faith fits a distorted version of religious commitment.
Perry's distinction between "faith" and "belief," if accepted,
would mean that no conviction based upon real religion-i.e,
the commitment embodied in religious belief, not some artificially abstracted faith-would be permitted into the public
realm. 113 Those religious persons who are firmly committed to
their faith-and who often advocate conservative political
beliefs--would be excluded. This vision may suit theorists whose
political beliefs are left of center, but there are no reasons

111 See discussion supra part LB.
112 See discussion supra part I.C.
113 Thus, Perry's program has the effect of a secularist's, even if Perry does
not consider himself a secularist.
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(other than transparently political ones) to adopt Perry's position.
B.

Reason and Politics

Some secularists accept that religious convictions may play
a role in motivating political positions, but that such reliance
must be bracketed in justifications. 114 In their political ideal,
universal reason, or at least premises and methods of reasoning generally accepted in our culture, will eventually be able to
resolve political issues/ 15 and therefore religion, with its private sources of insights, will play no role in such resolutions.116 In the words of Stephen Gey, "religion is fundamentally incompatible" with "the critical rationality on which democracy depends," because religious ideas cannot be scientifically proven. 117 Politics is to be rational and voluntary, not
irrational and dictated by religious leaders. Only secular reasons are therefore permitted in debating political positions. 118

114 E.g., Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 284.
115 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 24-30.
116 It should be noted that some philosophers and theologians think that
religion is as publicly accessible as science, i.e., revealed claims are accessible to
all or fundamental religious claims are provable by publicly accessible reason (e.g.,
reliance on public evidence and reason in the classical proofs of the existence of
God). These theorists believe that religious beliefs are objective, and that anyone
who accepts their truth will see that. (Under such a position, that their arguments
do not convince everyone only shows the limitation of any appeal to public reason.)
Others would argue that even mystical experiences are open to everyone-we merely must be willing to undergo the rigors of the training. One theorist, Ronald
Green, believes that "religions are primarily moved by rational moral concerns."
REUGION AND MORAL REASON 228 (1988). Theocrats may also feel that their authorities are open to all. See discussion supra note 65. Since I do not adhere to
this position on the nature of religious faith, I will not use it for support. There
may be some beliefs held within both religious and nonreligious ways of life which
are rational in the sense that everyone who understood them would accept them,
whether they are within that religious tradition or not. See Some Further
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 1032. But all basic belief-commitments-religious and
nonreligious-are nonrational (as discussed below). Even if all the political arguments made by the religious and nonreligious within their particular ways of life
satisfied a public accessibility standard, the basic commitments of the ways of life
will still not be dictated by those arguments (as discussed below). Fundamental
choices will remain. But for the issue of governing, it is the secular purpose and
justification requirements, not any alleged rationality of political claims, that differentiates the arguments.
117 Gey, supra note 20, at 174.
118 This position is broadly based on a commitment to rationalism of the
modern Enlightenment. Publicly accessible reason is our highest faculty; it can
destroy superstitions, dissolve delusions, and resolve all disagreements-in fact,
reason will provide a basis for ethics and hence for politics, and lead to a univer-
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Of course, rationality does play a role in politics to a certain extent. Presumably, no legislature would pass a bill for
which supporters can only advance a justification that is patently irrational in the sense that it is somehow based on an
empirical claim for which there is no empirical support (e.g.,
Martians are threatening to invade if we do not pass the bill).
The proper response to such a situation for one committed to
rationality is not to exclude such a claim from the market place
of ideas, but to address it with counter-arguments. We all hope
that the totally irrational claims would be weeded out in such a
process.
However, beyond such a situation, it is not clear in what
sense "rationality" is involved in politics. John Rawls, while
denying any overarching standard in terms of which competing
concepts of societal good can be adjudicated, speaks of liberals'
belief in a set of "ideals, principles and standards that all members of society can not only affirm but also mutually recognize
before one another" when it comes to any social issue over
which there is political dispute. 119 Rawls had earlier spoken
of "evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all," and defined the standards as "common sense and science." 120 Liberals think that, given enough time, publicly-accessible reason
will resolve political disputes. Concerning political problems on
the more mundane end of the spectrum (e.g., how best to help
victims of a hurricane), people with different religious and
nonreligious points of views can usually form an "overlapping
consensus" in which their diverging and incommensurable
fundamental points of view do not matter (although differences
may continue, e.g., over what in fact constitutes the best help).
The problem for the liberals' position arises with the more
fundamental social issues and policies (e.g., civil rights, wars,
abortion, pomography, homosexuality, or religion in the public

sal rational civilization. For criticism of the very possibility of the Enlightenment
project, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFI'ER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
119 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 4 n.5 (1987). Rawls, while a liberal, should not be included among the secularists since his idea of an overlapping consensus includes "all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more
or less just constitutional democratic society." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 225-26 (1985). This consensus
does not involve a commitment to a specific conception of the good or a substantive worldview or ideal, as do the secularists' visions.
120 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212, 240-41 (1971). See also PERRY,
supra note 2, at 60.
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schools). Here, science and common sense will not resolve the
political dispute. The problem is the presence of conflicting
fundamental premises over societal goals, the nature of a person, and so forth. Within our constitutional framework, reasons
must be public, in the sense of not being theocratic-reasons
based exclusively on revealed texts or private insights are not
sufficient in political debates for the constitutional reasons
discussed above. Liberals, however, would require a stronger,
substantive sense of public reasons: only reasons grounded in
principles of science and the supposed common sense of a culture would be permitted. Any other reasons not shared by all
(which would include most religious beliefs, not merely theocratic ones) would be excluded.
But for political issues that touch upon basic beliefs, no
shared beliefs and values will collectively suffice to overcome
the conflict of premises. 121 Indeed, it is not clear how science
would figure into determining the basic issues, such as social
goals. Scientific knowledge may contribute to the determination
of which values seem "reasonable" in light of particular theories, but science cannot resolve all the basic value questions.
For example, we may all agree on a scientific account of the
development of a human fetus and still disagree on when life
begins or to what rights the fetus is entitled. Decisions over
social goals are informed by science, but more encompassing
sets of values than science's are involved in resolving such
issues. Political issues involving a conflict over basic values will
remain moral crises precisely because of the intractable divergence of basic premises.
It is doubtful whether any neutral ground for arguing
about value and belief premises can be proposed without begging the question against some of the participants. (Secularists,
as most people would, propose standards for politics which
implicitly permit themselves to rely upon their own premises
and eliminate those groups which offend them.) But it is not
obvious that a "common reason" or any neutral ground to resolve political disputes is in fact needed. As long as different
religious and nonreligious participants can understand each
other, no more commonality is needed. In science, progress has
been possible even though the disputants over changing theories speak, in an important sense, different ''languages" about
121 See RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 3, at 87-172, for a strong case
against believing that publicly accessible reason can resolve all political issues.
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experiential data (e.g., Ptolemy and Copernicus meant quite
different things by the word "sun"). Understanding each other
without a common language is similar to comparing different
map projections-the maps are incommensurable, but we can
locate points in any projection. In such circumstances, scientific
disputes have been resolved and science has progressed without the translation of different languages into some (nonexistent) neutral observation-language.
If scientists can resolve disputes and form a consensus
without a common, neutral language, then disputants in a
political dialogue should not be required to operate with a neutral language. The religious may use religious language, and
the nonreligious may avoid such language. There is no need for
only one language, even if a neutral language between religious
and nonreligious discourse were possible. There is also no need
for translating religious arguments into nonreligious ones (or
vice-versa), even if this were possible. 122 The crucial requirement is that each of the disputants can understand the other's
points. A genuine argument on the different political positions
is then possible.
Many secularists appear to have a very unsophisticated
faith in the power of reason and in an alleged "scientific method." They do not explore the issue of rationality at all. In using
rationality as exemplified in science as their ideal, they seem to
think that "rationality" is something obvious and unproblematic. But under the contemporary philosophical accounts of
science, the very notion of "rationality" is seen as beset with
difficulties. Indeed, it is not at all clear how exactly reason, in

122 Contra PERRY, supra note 2, at 105-08; see also Religious Convictions,
supra note 3, at 256-57. Religious participants may omit arguments which they
think will not be persuasive to anyone outside their religious group; but this does
not mean that the reasons the religious decide to present to opponents are "translations" of their fundamental beliefs into "public" terms. A true translation of religious language into a nonreligious language--a "publicly comprehensible" or "mediating" one-cannot be accomplished in any meaningful sense. Unlike simply
translating, for example, English into French (which would keep the religious
meaning), no translation of religious language into a nonreligious one could be
done without, by definition, losing the religious elements. It would be comparable
to treating a two-dimensional depiction of an object as the object's equivalent. The
projection captures some of the object, but there is also loss and distortion. If secularists had to "translate" their fundamental beliefs into religious ones, distortion
would also occur. Imposing a neutral language requirement would only encourage
sham purposes and other deceptions on both sides, not full disclosure of real reasons. But if there is no need for a neutral language (as is the case with science),
this problem does not exist.
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the abstract, figures in the development of science. The physicist Max Planck gave this suggestive comment on how science
changes: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing
its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows
up that is familiar with it." 123 Reason and an ideal "scientific
method" as envisioned by the liberals do not seem to play a
determinative role. Scientific argument is seen today more as a
matter of persuasion-Thomas Kuhn even speaks of a "conversion experience" 124-than of some neutral algorithm determining a decision between competing theories. Paul
Feyerabend can say with all the seriousness that the
self-proclaimed Dadaist of epistemology can muster that "anything goes" in science and "irrationality" reigns. 125 The title to
one of his books clearly reflects his position--Farewell to Reason.'zs
Needless to say, not all philosophers follow such an extreme position on reason, but most have given up the empiricist ideal of neutral sense-experience or any encompassing
decision-making mechanisms determining the selection of a
theory. Scientists are seen as engaged in a more typical human
enterprise, rather than simply mechanically reading objective
truth off of nature. They must choose the best available theory
from among currently competing theories by weighing such factors as fruitfulness, coherence with other ideas, simplicity,
scope, and empirical fit. But, choices remain-reality does not
uniquely determine one theory as better or more acceptable
than the rest. No set of neutral sense-experiences compels the
choice between competing theories in any simple manner. And
no "scientific method" for devising hypotheses, testing them,
and adding irrefutable facts to our storehouse of knowledge
exists for any scientific inquiry. A role for the non-rational (in
the sense of beliefs that are not demonstrable regardless of

123 MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY 33-34 (F. Gaynor trans., 1949),
quoted in THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 151 (2d
ed. 1970).
124 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 151 (2d
ed. 1970).
125 If we remove his rhetoric, Feyerabend means by "irrationality," the lack of
any formal algorithm compelling rational agreement among scientists. See PAUL
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTUNE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWL·
EDGE (1975).
126 See generally PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO REASON (1978).
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background beliefs) is made in scientific decision-making, and
how agreement over a new theory emerges becomes a central
problem.
Not only is there no one "scientific method" for determining
"truth," even standards of rationality ("reasonableness") appear
not to be timeless but in fact to vary with different theories.127 Rationality involves not merely coherence of beliefs or
holding one's beliefs open to criticism, but what is "plausible"
in light of the underlying beliefs and values held at the time.
The framework of what one takes to be the structure of reality-what is real-becomes intertwined in what is taken to be
"rational," "natural," or "logical." 128 "Common sense" changes
from era to era. In short, rationality is now seen as having a
substantive component, dependent on what one believes about
reality, not merely procedural features such as self-criticism or
belonging to an on-going community of investigators.
Without going further into philosophy of science, the point
here is simply that rationality is no longer seen as a simple
concept, or as some abstract factor independent of our web of
other beliefs and values. If rationality in an enterprise such as
science is problematic, then surely secularists should not glibly
invoke reason and scientific method as a cure-all in so chaotic
an enterprise as politics.
When it comes to the issue of religion in politics, one particular aspect of reasoning which leads to the secularists'
misconstrual of reason should be pointed out. What is missing
from the liberals' view of reasoning is any role for the underlying frameworks of values and beliefs concerning the ultimate
nature of reality, nature of a person, what is good, what can be
expected, goals to be achieved, and so forth. 129 Arguments are
only made within such frameworks-our most deeply-held

127 See THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in
THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE

320 (1977).
128 Whether this view produces a cognitive relativism (each way of life internally setting up its own standards of truth and rationality, with no external
standards by which to adjudicate among competing ways of life) will not be discussed here.
129 These fundamental frameworks could be referred to as "metaphysics," although the term has pejorative connotations. The frameworks are not beyond experience but are the most basic belief-commitments framing our experiences. They
can be argued about and are open to change-they are deeply held, but not immutable. But while we may hold our frameworks up to criticism and revision, they
are open to criticism only from within one or another such framework.
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beliefs are the scaffolding holding our arguments together.
Basic world views specify how things "really are" and what is
"objective" for their holder. What is "reasonable" and who is
being reasonable become normative issues. For example, Christian fundamentalists argue that if we do not accept the literal
truth of the Bible and that Jesus is the Son of God, we are not
seeing the way things really are and so are not being "reasonable" in its ultimate sense.
The anti-religious, on the other hand, think this is not
being "reasonable"-indeed, accepting Biblical claims in spite of
science is the epitome of irrationality. They give natural science
a metaphysical interpretation: science exhausts our knowledge-it is the only way of knowing, and only what is known
through science is real. The anti-religious' arguments make
sense only within that framework. 130 However, the basic premises of their positions compete on the same level with those of
the fundamentalists. That is, the dispute is not over empirical
evidence for an empirical claim, but a contest over a metaphysics of naturalism versus a metaphysics in which a rational
being (the god of classical theism) intervenes in nature. 131
Whether this conflict between such positions is resolvable
through reasoning is unlikely, precisely because of the
disputants' commitments to conflicting basic beliefs and values.
Secularists hope to eliminate reference to all such frameworks of belief, religious and nonreligious. 132 Indeed, they

130 A limited but more direct example is how "theory" shapes "fact" in political scientists' study of American religion. Political theorists largely ignore the role
of religion in human affairs because certain social theories dominating political
science circles predict the inevitable decline of religion; these theories dictate what
political scientists consider important, and what they consider irrelevant. Allen D.
Hertzke, American Religion and Politics: A Review Essay, 41 W. POL. Q. 825
(1988). Religion as a social force is thereby filtered out of what these theorists
consider causal factors. While religion may in fact decline someday, these theorists'
persistence today in adhering to these theories as ways of explaining American
society is truly amazing considering the continuing significance of religion in our
culture and our political life.
131 At least some claims advanced by biblical fundamentalists can be defended in ways other than biblical literalism. See Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and
Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible, 21 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 8 (1991).
Whether or not we find Plantinga's arguments convincing, no one would consider
him irrational in any usual sense of the term.
132 Not all secularists (e.g., Audi) are clear that nonreligious frameworks
must be treated in the same way as religious ones. Edward Foley is clearer on
equal treatment in his Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954
(1992) (book review). There would be a clear violation of the Establishment Clause
if references to religious frameworks of belief are all to be treated differently and
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would deny any appeal to truth in political argument. 133 No
claim that advocated that values or goals reflect the nature of
reality could be supported. But, for a reason to be convincing, it
cannot be abstracted from a total argument. As with scientific
disputes, reasons presuppose a background of belief. What is
and is not taken to be a reason depends on such background,
and it is impossible to extricate reasons from their context-if
''public reason" is supposed to be something that will convince
anyone regardless of their background beliefs, then no such
reason concerning fundamental political matters exists. Since
normally most people argue only with those who share a common framework of belief, there is usually no need to examine
our background beliefs. But when disputes arise between participants with conflicting background belief-commitments, as
happens in political disputes (e.g., over abortion on when life
begins and on the rights of a fetus), the background beliefs
often must be made explicit. Many arguments each participant
advances often only make sense when seen within the context
of a conflict of basic frameworks.
That all religious and nonreligious people reason only within such frameworks means that the frameworks cannot be
eliminated. Of course, different religious and nonreligious persons may reach the same conclusions for different reasons-after all, one can reach only a limited number of final
conclusions on any political issue. Also, as mentioned earlier,
there is no one "religious" position on any political issue, past
or present, or by contrast, one "secular" position. But this does
not mean that religious people somehow reach their conclusions
through some neutral considerations other than religious premises so that the frameworks within which they reason can
somehow be jettisoned, or that there is a common abstract
ground upon which they are in reality arguing. People only
reason within their total framework; it provides their orientation of what makes sense. People advance what seem to them

excluded, while references to nonreligious ones are permitted into the political
arena. The same would hold if we forced all political arguments to be stated within one framework. Nonreligious frameworks for belief (e.g., science metaphysically
interpreted as naturalism) are as much "beyond reason" as religious ones: people
who have adopted any nonreligious fundamental beliefs about the way things really
are cannot advance reasons that are neutral between all ways of life to defend
their choice and to convince all "reasonable" opponents. All fundamental commitments, religious and otherwise, are in the same class in this regard.
133 Nagel, supra note 1, at 229.
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to be evidence or reasons only within that context. Even if their
reasons, like their conclusions, converge with other people's
reasons in an abstract sense, this does not mean that their
framework of belief is somehow irrelevant to their thinking or
that their reasons are actually nonreligious.
Consider the role of morality in ways of reasoning. Even if
a theist and an atheist converge on exactly the same set of
moral precepts, morality still is not independent of religion for
a religious person, any more than it is really dependent upon a
religious reality for the atheist. As a philosophical matter, we
may argue that morality is not dependent for its value or justification on the existence of God or any other religiously-significant reality, but this does not mean that morality
is really an independent, nonreligious value system which is
merely tacked onto a religious way of life. For the religious,
morality is not a nonreligious component of a religious way of
life. Indeed, whether morality is an autonomous point of view
independent of an arguer's interests or particular conceptions
of what is good is open to question. 134
Morality does not appear to be a universal layer of reasoning independent of every other belief and value in one's way of
life. 135 Instead, beliefs of what is real affect what we determine to be valuable and what we should do or achieve. Thus, in
moral religious ways of life, morality is integral to the thinking
and acting of the religious persons, and basic religious beliefs
and values form the foundation for their moral arguments.
Trying, in the name of creating a common playing field for
politics, to force religious persons to think morally without resorting to the other components integrated into their faith
would be asking for either the impossible or something so arti-

134 See JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY
AND THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 218-55 (1981).
135 One cannot argue that all people actually hold the same moral beliefs by
facilely distinguishing the content of a moral code from the reasons or motives for
holding it. To be deemed moral, a code of conduct must be based upon a concern
for the well-being of others. But the assumption that the concrete prescriptions in
all moral codes are the same is far from certain. For example, the scope of injunctions against murder vary widely: Buddhist and Jaina codes of conduct tend to
condemn all killing of humans and animals; other codes limit their injunctions in
different ways. It appears that the content of different codes of conduct shapes and
is shaped by the other components of the total ways of life of which they are part.
See RICHARD H. JONES, MYSTICISM EXAMINED 187-215 (1993). Any consensus reflected in a society's laws does not mean that the scope and content of the various
religious codes of the society's members are similarly limited.
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ficial as not to reflect their true position. The same holds true
for trying to force nonreligious persons to genuinely think "religiously."
In such circumstances, all persons will rely on their most
fundamental beliefs and values when they advance purposes,
justifications, and conclusions in arguing about significant political issues. Reasoning is too complicated to be broken neatly
into a publicly accessible or moral component and a separable
belief component constituted by background beliefs. People do
not argue with isolated abstract points while ignoring the rest
of what appear reasonable to them. And any political theory
which would attempt to require such artificiality cannot be
acceptable. It is a fantasy to think religious people can delete
the "religious" parts of their ways of life and still be left with
any kind of meaningful whole from which to defend a position.
People cannot compartmentalize their lives and beliefs in such
a manner.
This also means that everyone relies on non-rational elements in their reasoning, i.e., beliefs which are not demonstrable regardless of background beliefs. We all have nonrational
commitments which set the bounds within which reason operates. Only within those bounds do the issues arise of the rationality or irrationality, justification or lack thereof, of a particular belief. 136 We cannot verify all our beliefs within our
web of beliefs by standards independent of those beliefs.
Most importantly, secularists are not in an epistemologically superior position in this regard to the religious. Religious
people are not inherently irrational, nor secularists inherently
rational. Contrary to the liberal image of religion, religion and
reason are not opposing activities. Instead, the religious, like
everyone else, can reason and argue within a framework of
belief. Both the religious and the nonreligious have
non-rational presuppositions setting up the framework within
which they argue-everyone has unprovable elements in the
body of their beliefs, no matter how informed by science their
beliefs may be.
Calling ultimate belief-commitments "non-rational" may
make such commitments sound arbitrary, unreasonable or
irrational. However, the point is simply that no ultimate belief
and value premises can be established by the reasoning we use
136 See Thomas W. Clark, Relativism and the Limits of Rationality, HUMANIST
Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 25 (giving an account of this position on a popular level).
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once we adopt those premises, since we use the basic premises
as a fundamental component of the arguments. The least
changeable strands of our webs of belief are a substantive component to our rationality. As discussed above, reasons are advanced only within ways of life. There is no abstract reason
disembodied from beliefs and values about what is real. 137
There is no neutral, universal, objective point of view-a privileged "view from nowhere" which portrays things as they really
are independently of a particular human condition-from which
we can disinterestedly judge different ways of life. This also
means that we judge other ways of life (and criticize our own)
only from within a framework to which we have made at least
a tentative commitment. Secularists cannot merely wish away
the deep beliefs that divide us by saying that they should not
be part of our reasoning.
One consequence of this is that religious and nonreligious
frameworks may become part of some political arguments.
Indeed, whatever major political issues are at the time intractable will involve basic beliefs, and so may end up being more
about the background commitments than the political actions
alone. Such arguments will be frustrating and the possibility of
agreement will be slim. All participants can state their position, their reasons for it, and address their opponents' arguments. People do reach the same political conclusion from a
limited set of choices, although for different reasons. But as
long as a wide pluralism of conflicting fundamental beliefs and
values on many social issues remains in our society, there is
little possibility of a reasoned resolution of those issues in the
sense of all parties agreeing to one belief-framework and argumg with shared terms within that framework to an
agreement. 138

See P. F. STRAWSON, SKEPI'ICJSM AND NATURALISM 38 (1985).
Basic beliefs, values and codes of conduct do not always determine political positions in a simple manner. For example, if the value-component of a way of
life is only a general ethos and the belief-component is only a general worldview,
then the specifics necessary to make the ethos operative will have to come from
factors other than the basic framework of belief. For example, Christians are commended to love their neighbors, but what specific actions are required to do this in
each concrete situation is not always made clear in the basic religious texts; the
role of continuous teaching and interpretations by religious authorities thereby becomes important. Where such interpretations are needed, political arguments may
be able to proceed without concentrating on the basic values and beliefs; the disputes will deal more with the less deeply-embedded factors. But some religious
beliefs and codes of rules are very detailed (e.g., the Old and New Testaments, if
137
138
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Thus, there is no reason to expect a "rational" resolution of
some significant political issues in the sense secularists hope
for, and the faith of liberalism in the power of abstract reason
is therefore misplaced. Secularists simply do not appreciate the
high standard they are requiring. They are not demanding
rationality in the sense of coherence of beliefs or reason understood instrumentally as determining the best means to an end.
Instead, they are asking for the impossible-a reasoned justification of all of one's web of beliefs. Even earning a Ph.D. in
philosophy would not enable one to participate in such a political ideal.
Of course, given enough time, a consensus on issues once
in controversy will emerge, at least temporarily. But this only
means that the consensus results from various social or political factors, not from reason alone as liberals envision the process. Max Planck's view of how science progresses, cited earlier,
may be even more applicable, mutatis mutandis, to political
solutions of fundamental social issues. Fortunately, the Establishment Clause requirements, not any ideal of publicly accessible reason or rational dialogue, are all that matter for our society in this area.

C.

The Secularists' Visions of a Society as Ideals

The last section argued that the secularists' visions for our
society are not plausible because of an unrealistic faith in the
power of reason disembodied from any fundamental beliefs and
values to resolve disputes. The last point to be made is that,
even if they were plausible, the secularists' visions are inconsistent with the constitutional foundations of this country as long
as religion with any kind of public dimension continues to exist.
Although secularists may claim no hostility toward religion
(but only neutrality by removing all references to both religious
and nonreligious frameworks of belief), their ideal for good
citizenship in a democratic society forces religion to be no more
than a personal hobby or a private club without a role to play
in the public arena. 139 At best, religious ministers would be
read literally, contain specific condemnations of homosexuality). Thereby, political
positions for those who opt for a theocratic political program (see discussion supra
part I.B) are determined more directly from the basic religious framework. Conflicts
among various religious and nonreligious basic commitments would be central in
those cases.
139 Some secularists may be motivated by the belief that religion is a harm-
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permitted to spout broad moral platitudes but nothing concrete-they can tell people "be good" or "do the right thing," but
not tell them how actually to do this with regard to any political issue. 140 Individuals would be left to decide on their own
all political issues, since their leaders would not be permitted
to advise them on this entire aspect of their lives. How this
proposal could be implemented without the clergy losing all
credibility with the religious, or without simply appearing silly
to everyone, is not clear. Any voice of Christian or other ministers or institutional leaders on basic moral issues would be
lost. 141 Religion under these circumstances would be totally
without effect in the political realm, even indirectly-in short,
religion under this vision should be totally privatized.
Such a vision is inconsistent with the role of religion envisioned by the Framers of the Establishment Clause for our
society: ours is not a secular society, and politics is not secular
(in sense of being anti-religious or nonreligious). 142 The time
may have passed when someone would readily describe America as, in the words of G. K. Chesterson, "a nation with the soul
of a church." 143 But the Supreme Court has long recognized
that "religious values pervade the fabric of our national
life." 144 By all social indicia, Americans are as religious as
ever, and the social/political expression of that religiosity is
ful delusion, a superstition, or otherwise irrational. But, as with religious persons
in politics, the secularists' motives need not be explored-here, the effect of their
program (to relegate religion to the purely private sphere) is what is important.
140 Cf The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 274-75; Religious Commitment, supra note 1, at 69 (clergy may encourage political activism but
not specific political actions). The secularists' restriction is broader than the
tax-exemption restrictions noted above (n. 97) in that the latter only cover specific
involvement in lobbying and political campaigns. See supra text accompanying note
97. For example, under Audi's proposal, Roman Catholic priests could not recommend that Catholics vote against all candidates who support abortion rights.
141 If the religious are to provide no voice in public affairs, then the silence
and complicity of the Lutheran Church under Nazi rule in Germany in the 1930's
may be the example that secularists want American churches to exemplify.
142 See discussion supra part II.A.
143 Quoted in Sidney E. Mead, The "Nation with the Soul of a Church", reprinted in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 45 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones,
eds., 1974).
144 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). Some justices would go
further. Justice William 0. Douglas earlier said: "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952). Justice Robert Jackson said that "for good or for ill, nearly everything in
our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences." McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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also as much alive. Our situation may change in the future,
and religion may wither away through various social and economic forces. But until that occurs, the denial of any public role
for religion is inconsistent with the vision of society embodied
in the Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court recently
said: "A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion
from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent
with the Constitution." 145 The requirement of a secular purpose and secular justification, along with other requirements, is
imposed by the Establishment Clause, but not the secularists'
requirements of secular (nonreligious) argumentation and motivation that would produce a religionless public arena.
Audi and others pay lip service to the Establishment
Clause's separation of church and state but nothing in their
writings indicate that their positions are informed by the
clause's history or case law, or that they have any sense of its
significance. (The same is true of our Free Exercise and Free
Speech interests.) In speaking of "ideals" for our society, 146
the secularists give the appearance of arguing about church
and state when in fact they conceive no public role for
churches. Audi must realize that the Establishment Clause
does not actually support his position, for he speaks of the
"spirit" of the separation of church and state. 147 But he wants
to use the Establishment Clause in a way it was never intended in order to create a secular public life (i.e., a society with no
public religion). In short, he wants to separate religion from
politics, not church from state. The Framers did not intend the
Establishment Clause to do this. 148
The explanation for the secularists' lack of interest in the
Establishment Clause or other possible legal restrictions on the
role of religion is very simple: they are not interested in American society as now constituted. The secularists' "ideals" are
simply visions for another society, not proposals about the prop145 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
146 The Separation o( Church and State, supra note 1, at 276, 283; Religious
Commitment, supra note 1, at 76; PERRY, supra note 2, at 137.
147 The Separation of Church and State, supra note 1, at 283. This use of
the idea of the "spirit" of the "separation of church and state" is disturbing. Would
secularists use the "spirit" of the Free Speech Clause (which also restricts only
governmental actions) to censor private speech? If the Establishment Clause does
not apply, why do secularists speak of it at all, except intentionally or unintentionally to give the appearance of authority and credibility to a normative political
position unrelated to the Constitution?
148 See discussion supra part IIA.
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er interpretation of church/state relations within the existing
framework provided by our Constitution. Therefore, an anchor
in the legal foundations of this country in the Establishment
Clause or other constitutional protections is unnecessary. The
secularists' vision of a society in which religion is privatized
(i.e., having no public function or influenced) becomes a vision
of a society in which people who do not withdraw from society
will have to hold a nonreligious worldview in some fashion.
This is because a truncated form of religion-one that did not
inform all of the faithful's life but only his or her private activity-is impossible. As discussed earlier, the source of meaning
for the religious governs all of the religious person's life, not
just selected portions of it. 149
However, in dictating which parties may participate in the
public life, the secularists' vision is not neutral but is based
upon a substantive belief-system. 15° From a constitutional
point of view, their visions become in effect the nonreligious
equivalents of a theocracy. Since the secularists' visions entail
a comprehensive belief-system, they must be defended as such.
They are as ideological as theocratic visions for society, and
indeed would compete with those and other visions for a society. In turn, this means that secularists' arguments must operate on the same level as those of theocrats arguing for a theocratic state. Thus, secularists must present arguments for the
superiority of a nonreligious worldview. 151 Neither party can
argue that the burden of proof is on the other-each must argue for the viability of a way of life on the fundamental level of
a basic vision.
Thus, secularists should be clear in their arguments that
they are proposing visions for another society and not proposing changes within the constitutional framework of our existing
one. Part of the secularists' political agenda may be to establish
a thoroughly religionless world. There is nothing wrong with

149 See discussion supra part LB.
150 Rawls' conception of an overlapping consensus is neutral (permitting all
beliefs to compete) and is not a substantive requirement of "neutral discourse" or
any comprehensive belief-system which would eliminate participants with religious
commitments. See discussion supra note 119.
151 To be consistent, secularists cannot appeal to "truth," i.e., that their values reflect reality. Instead, they may attempt to show that nonreligious ideologies
are socially more desirable, e.g., less divisive and volatile. Examples of 20th Century secular (nonreligious) ideologies that have gained political control-e.g., fascism,
communism, and various nationalisms-may present problems.
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such political advocacy, and their motives for it are irrelevant.
But their complete program of proposed governmental actions
and restrictions should be made explicit. Secularists would ask
the same of theocrats and other religious participants in politics.
V.

CONCLUSION

Political philosophers have the reputation of spinning
grand visions that are out of touch with the realities of our
society. The work of most of the theorists discussed here only
confirms that reputation. As a force for reform within our current constitutional system, the secularists' visions for a new
society (even if they were plausible) are not very effective because they do not deal with religion as it actually functions,
and they have no interest in the role of religion currently permitted in politics. Throughout the history of our country, liberal and conservative religious groups have been forces on all
sides of political issues in ways that have been consistent with
the Establishment Clause. Our Constitution has set up a
framework within which we can assess the propriety of any
public religious activities. We should remain vigilant in making
such assessments and focus less on fabricating ivory tower
fantasies of societies in which an unrealistic version of reason
determines everything and in which no fundamental beliefs
except those of the secularists play a role.

